Investors and policy makers often view agency and Treasury debt as substitutes, even formally so in some contexts. Using a large sample of Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) issues and corporate, financial issues floated during 1994-2004, we study the behavior of the portion of spreads over Treasury yields that are unexplained by standard issue and issuer characteristics. GSE residual yields (1) reflect priced, time-varying macroeconomic risk, (2) strongly correlate with non-GSE residual spreads, (3) responded similarly to non-GSE yields during the Long Term Capital Management Crisis. In terms of exposure to macroeconomic risk, agency debt is surprisingly comparable to corporate debt.
Agency debt issued by Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac is thought by many to carry an implicit federal guarantee against default, even though formal backing by the full faith and credit by the U.S. Government is absent. For this and other reasons, agency debt has long held special status as a near substitute for Treasury debt. Ambrose and King (2002) find evidence that as the stock of Treasury debt fell during the late 1990s, investors increasingly turned to a growing supply of GSE debt. In some contexts, substitutability is made explicit. For example, to meet reserve requirements, U.S. banks are allowed to treat certain types of agency debt as equivalent to obligations issued by the United States. 1 The extent to which agency debt carries an implicit federal guarantee, and the resulting economic effects, are the subjects of considerable research and discussion. Outside an incident of financial distress, however, a question with great day-to-day relevance is how GSE yields and prices respond to macroeconomic shocks. Do the institutional similarities between Treasury and GSE debt manifest themselves in similar responses to macroeconomic risk, or does GSE debt behave more like corporate debt than commonly acknowledged? 1 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association describes agency debt as follows: "Most agency and GSE debt is not backed by the 'full faith and credit' of the federal government, but investors generally treat the securities as if they had negligible credit risk. The markets believe the federal government would prevent an agency or GSE from defaulting on its debt because of its role in promoting public policy and because of the shear size of the largest of the agencies" (quoted from www.investingingbonds.com, accessed November 14, 2006) . It is notable that GSE issuers are exempt from Securities and Exchange Commission filing requirements.
We take a first step in this inquiry and find that in terms of required yields at issue, bond markets treat the debt of GSE issuers and corporate, financial issuers very similarly. On this important dimension, at least, agency debt is not a good substitute for Treasury debt-like corporate debt, agency debt carries significant time-varying risk premia over and above that in Treasury yields.
To pursue our investigation, we estimate regressions to explain the yield spreads (issuing yields over the yields of maturity-matched Treasury rates) of 4,864 debt issues floated by sixty-three frequent financial sector (non-GSE) issuers over the 1994-2004 time period. We include standard explanatory variables to control for bond and issuer characteristics. We then compute the cross-sectional medians (across all issues regardless of issuer identity) of the residuals to obtain a time series of unexplained residual spreads. Since we control for bond and issuer characteristics, and because medians are taken cross-sectionally across many issuers, these monthly median residual spreads should capture a time series of a macroeconomic risk that is priced in the financial sector issues. We apply the same methodology to nearly 8,946 GSE debt issues over the same time period and obtain a similar time series of median residual spreads for the GSE issues.
2 As Figure 1 shows, median GSE and non-GSE residual spreads appear to reflect time-varying risk factors that have very similar time series patterns over the sample period.
Using a regression framework, we confirm that median non-GSE residual spreads at issue have significant power to explain GSE yield spreads at issue. In a baseline regression to explain GSE yield spreads without including median non-GSE residuals on the right-hand side,
we obtain an adjusted R-squared of 0.253. Adding the median non-GSE residual spread in the regression increases the adjusted R-squared to 0.357. An additional refinement allows for distinct monthly intercept terms, hence further controlling for macroeconomic risk. 3 In this model, the adjusted R-squared increases yet further to 0.482. Figure 2 plots the median GSE residual spreads from these three models and shows a dramatic reduction in median residual volatility that results from controlling for macroeconomic risk.
To further investigate the similarity between the responses of offer yields to macroeconomic shocks, we examine spread behavior around the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998 during which there was a reported flight from risky debt to Treasury debt. We first reestimate a regression for the non-GSE issues and include an indicator variable for whether the issue occurs during the LTCM crisis. The results imply that after controlling for other factors, non-GSE spreads were around 73% (38 basis points) higher on average during the crisis, confirming that yield spreads significantly increased for corporate, financial sector issues.
We perform the same exercise for the GSE sample and find that for these issues, spreads were around 75% higher (24 basis points) higher on average. The positive reaction in the yield spread is notable because, similar to what we observe for corporate debt, it implies 3 The non-GSE median residuals are also included as an explanatory variable in this regression, but they are first reestimated to remove the monthly intercept effect to mitigate multicolinearity.
investors demanded considerably higher spreads over Treasury yields. After a refinement that controls for shifts in the treasury yield curve itself during this crisis, we are left with the same qualitative result: the bond issues of both GSEs and non-GSEs experienced significantly elevated spreads. This provides further evidence, using a significant and exogenous macroeconomic shock, that agency debt is not insulated from macroeconomic risk. Investors in agency issues demand spreads over Treasuries that compensate for macroeconomic risk in a very similar fashion to those required for corporate issues.
Our findings have significant implications for bond investors and policy makers. Prior literature documents that agency debt carries positive yield spreads over Treasury rates but that spreads are significantly lower than those on high quality corporate, financial sector debt by 20-40 basis points. This result is consistent with agency debt having a probabilistic federal guarantee and greater liquidity (see Ambrose and King, 2002 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I contains background discussion and a literature review, Section II outlines the data construction, and Section III documents borrowing behavior over time. In Section IV we report median yield spreads of the issues in our sample, where spreads are calculated by benchmarking each issue against a maturitymatched Treasury issue. Section V presents the analysis of yield spreads and their residuals through time, and Section VI concludes.
I. Background Discussion and Related Literature

A. The Seven Government Sponsored Entities
There are seven major GSEs charged with improving efficiency and liquidity in various Of course, another prominent reason for concern is the implicit federal backing that GSE debt is often thought to carry. Although agency debt is not formally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, many believe that US taxpayers will ultimately be on the hook if a GSE fails.
C. Prior Literature
Several papers document the "issuing, or funding subsidy" that GSEs receive in order to appraise the value of the implicit federal guarantee GSE debt is thought to include. For example, Ambrose and Warga (2002) 
II. Data
We build the data set of frequent GSE and non-GSE financial issuers as follows. Benchmark issues are designed to be large volume offerings that ostensibly benefit from enhanced liquidity in secondary market trading (see Ambrose and King, 2002 for a discussion and analysis of the impact of the Benchmark program).
III. Borrowing Behavior
The two rightmost columns show striking patterns in the use of variable rate and callable debt. Variable rate issues drop during the middle of the sample period for the housing GSEs (FNMA, FHLB, and FHLCM) and rise over time for the non-GSE financial firms. In addition, the percentage of variable rate debt is significantly higher for non-GSE financial issuers. The GSEs, however, rely more heavily on callable debt than their non-GSE financial counterparts and there is much heavier reliance in the later years for all GSEs but Sallie Mae.
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IV. Spreads Over Maturity-Matched Treasury Yields
The yield spread analysis focuses on the portion of the sample that consists of noncallable issues with maturities of at least one year. Table III presents, for this non-callable sample, median yield spreads over maturity matched Treasury yields. To generate an estimate of an issue's comparable constant maturity Treasury yield, we first fit a regression model for each trading day in the sample using 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 10 and 20 year Treasury yields taken from the 7 The use of callable and floating coupon debt is affected by strategic decisions with regards to managing interest rate exposure. The increased emphasis on callable debt by the housing GSEs potentially reflects technological advances that have streamlined and lowered the cost of refinancing a single family mortgage loan. In addition, the prepayment elasticity of mortgage assets is higher during the latter half of our sample due to lower interest rates in the economy. At times during our sample more than 60% of the origination volume of new single family mortgage loans is attributable to refinancing activity.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' FRED database. 8 We then use the appropriate day's estimated term structure model to estimate the Treasury yield for each debt issue in the sample (where the issue date determines which day's model we use).
As Table III shows, not surprisingly, median GSE yield spreads are nearly always below those of the non-GSEs. This finding is consistent with prior literature and is usually interpreted to reflect an implicit assumption of Federal protection against default. As implied by Ambrose and King (2002) , however, a portion of lower yield spreads that GSE debt enjoys may be due to its increased liquidity compared to corporate issues.
Yield spreads for all of the GSE issuers and the non-GSE financial firms exhibit two similar patterns through time. First, spreads are relatively stable during the first four years of the sample, followed by significant volatility in the later years. Second, all of the median raw spread columns exhibit a humped-shape pattern, reaching a maximum during 1999-2001. This coincides with the relative decline in debt issuance during the middle of the sample that is evident in Table I . In the section that follows, we investigate in more detail how GSE and non-GSE issue spreads covary through time. = the height of the short end of the yield curve relative to its long-term mean, which gives the curve its overall slope,
V. Time Series Behavior of Residual Maturity-Matched Yield Spreads
We now turn to our main research question, which is whether yields on GSE issues contain risk premia that varies in a similar way to the risk premia in non-GSE issues. We wish to answer three questions. First, do GSE spreads over Treasury yields display time-varying volatility that suggests priced, macroeconomic risk? Second, do GSE spreads covary through time with non-GSE spreads? Third, do GSE and non-GSE spreads react similarly to a significant and exogenous macroeconomic shock?
In pursuing these questions, we wish to focus on the portion of yields due to macroeconomic risk instead of that due to idiosyncratic issuer and issue features. We therefore implement a two a two-step procedure. First, we use OLS regressions to explain non-GSE spreads on the basis of issue characteristics and aggregate issuing behavior by the issuer. We then investigate whether median monthly non-GSE residual spreads, which should reflect timevarying risk factors, help to explain GSE spreads. By examining the portions of spreads unexplained by standard issue and issuer characteristics, and by taking monthly medians across multiple issuers, we should have a good metric of macroeconomic risk that is priced in the non-GSE issues. Hence, if the monthly median residuals of non-GSE spreads help explain GSE spreads, it suggests that the type of macroeconomic risk priced into non-GSE yields are also priced into GSE yields. Finally, we examine yield spread behavior in each sample during the Long Term Capital Management crisis in 1998 to investigate how spreads responded to a significant and exogenous macroeconomic shock.
2
= the height of the center of the curve relative to its endpoints, which creates the typical
A. The Response of Non-GSE and GSE Spreads to Time-Varying Macroeconomic Risk
Model (1) of Table IV estimates a regression explaining the non-GSE spreads on the basis of various issue and issuer characteristics (including issuer indicator variables that are not reported in the table). We note up front that our goal is not so much to interpret the signs and significance of these characteristics. Instead, the overriding goal is to reasonably control for obvious issue and issuer characteristics so that the residuals, especially once aggregated across issuers, should capture macroeconomic risk. To speed exposition, we will define the control variables but only very briefly discuss the coefficient values estimated in the model.
First, we include dichotomous variables to control for whether the issue is subordinated
(181 out of 4,864 bonds) and whether it is a zero coupon bond (five bonds). The zero coupon indicator is significant in Model (1), but does not remain so in Model (2) in which additional controls are included. Next we include the issue's maturity. As shown by the positive significance of the issue's maturity and the negative significance of its maturity squared, spreads are increasing and concave in maturity.
The next variable is the log of the total principal issued to date for the particular bond.
In some cases an issuer reopens a bond issue and issues additional principal with the same terms (and same CUSIP) at a later date. Obviously this affects the liquidity of the issue.
Hence, the variable we include controls for the size of the current issue but also reflects any principal of the same bond issued in the past. This variable is positive and significant, showing that for non-GSE issuers, larger issues are subject to higher yields. This indicates that despite curved shape observed in the middle section of fitted term structures.
the possibility that larger non-GSE issues are more liquid, they may also be considered riskier from a default perspective.
The next set of variables control for issuer behavior. Non-GSEs that are more active in the debt markets in terms of total principal issued during the month (across all issues) pay significantly higher yields. Like with the size of the issue, this may proxy for default risk that is not fully captured by the credit ratings in the model. In terms of numbers of issues, however, more frequent issuers pay lower yields.
Although the sample does not include callable or floating-rate bonds, we include the percent of overall debt the issuer floats during the month that is callable or floating-rate debt.
These variables will partially capture managerial decisions the issuer makes based on the current and forecasted interest rate environment, and we observe that both are significant.
Finally, we include indicator variables for the issue's credit rating (274 are AAA, 3,638 are AA, 438 are BAA, and 5 are BA). There are no bonds rated single A in the sample, and none are rated below BA. The omitted class is that of bonds for which SDC provides no rating (509). The coefficients imply that the average bond rating for those without ratings would be around BAA to BA.
In Model (2) we add two additional variables that help control for economic conditions in the debt market. The first is the yield on three-month Treasuries minus that on ten-year Treasuries, and its positive significance shows that the less upward sloping the Treasury yield curve is, the higher the spreads on non-GSE debt. This is intuitive in the sense that a downward sloping yield curve is often associated with recessionary forecasts, which would increase perceived default risk. Similarly, the regression shows that if default spreads are higher, as measured by the spread between BAA bonds and AAA bonds, the non-GSE issuers pay higher yields.
Models (3) and (4) estimate similar regressions to explain residual spreads for the GSE issues. 9 We include and report indicator variables for each of the GSE issuers (FHLB is the omitted issuer). We should not read much into the first two variables, because only one bond is coded as subordinated and only seven are zero coupon bonds. The regression estimates show that GSE yield spreads are not invariant to maturity, issue size, or issuer behavior during the month. This shows that GSE yield spreads do vary idiosyncratically based on characteristics that are commonly thought to measure default or liquidity risk. Model (4) also shows that the economic condition variables that should be related to aggregate default and liquidity risk have a significant impact on the yields that GSE issuers are charged. The magnitudes of the coefficients on the economic condition variables are fairly similar to those in the non-GSE regression in Model (2), which is interesting in and of itself.
To gain a sense of whether there is priced macroeconomic risk that is not captured by the explanatory variables, we turn to a graphical analysis of the residuals. First, we begin with Model (2) for the non-GSE sample. For each month we calculate the median residual (across all issuers). As noted, the idea here is that the portion of non-GSE yield spreads not explained by traditional issue and issuer characteristics, especially once aggregated across issuers by taking monthly medians, will measure of macroeconomic risk that is not controlled for in the 9 We do not include bond ratings in these regressions, since SDC does not include bond ratings for the GSE issues in our data. regression model. 10 It is important to note that although we cannot hope to completely control for issuer and issue characteristics in Model (2), we can decompose the residual spreads from the non-GSE regression into two pieces: one that captures time-varying macroeconomic risk, and another that captures noise due to issuer and issue characteristics that the model does not capture. The latter component will largely cancel out when we compute monthly medians across multiple issues floated by multiplier issuers.
Next, we calculate monthly median residual spreads for the GSE issues using Model (4). Figure 1 plots the time series of monthly median residual spreads for the GSE sample from
Model (2) alongside those for the non-GSE sample from Model (4). There two observations of note. First, median residuals vary through time in a way that suggests they are indeed measuring some type of macroeconomic risk that is priced (but not controlled for in the empirical models). This is evident in the patterns we observe trough time-the monthly median residuals are clearly not just random, as there are sustained periods of positive residuals followed by sustained periods of negative residuals. Second, the two time series are significantly correlated through time (the correlation coefficient is 62% with a p-value of less then 0.0001). This is initial evidence on our main research question, and suggests that GSE yields reflect macroeconomic risk in a similar fashion to that carried by non-GSE yields.
In Table V we further investigate the link between GSE yield spreads and macroeconomic risk. Model (1) repeats regression (4) from Table IV as a baseline regression.
10 All but five of the 132 months have at least five observations from which to calculate medians.
Including months with few residuals adds noise and biases against our findings, which are robust to only including months with greater numbers of observations.
In Model (2) we include the monthly median non-GSE residuals (estimated from Model (2) in Table IV ) as an explanatory variable. As can be seen, the median non-GSE residual variable is positive and highly significant as we would expect given the positive correlation so evident in Figure 1 . The coefficient's magnitude of 1.367 implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the median non-GSE residual increases the GSE yield spread, on average, by 15 basis points (a 46% increase from the median GSE spread in the sample of 32 basis points). The adjusted R-square increases from 0.253 in Model (1) to 0.357 in Model (2).
An alternative way to incorporate macroeconomic risk is to include monthly indicator variables, and approach we take in Model (3). Including monthly indicator variables instead of a single macroeconomic variable (the median non-GSE residual) should increase explanatory power because it uses many more variables to more precisely fit the data. It is not surprising, therefore, the adjusted R-squared in Model (3) increases to 0.479.
In Model (4) we include both median non-GSE residuals and monthly time indicators.
We have to be careful, however, to avoid colinearity. Recall that the median non-GSE residuals are estimated from Model (2) in Table IV , an empirical model without monthly time indicators included as explanatory variables. Hence, those particular median residuals implicitly include the information contained in monthly intercepts and including them in a regression that also includes monthly indicator variables will cause a severe colinearity problem.
To address this problem, we restimate Model (2) of The most interesting way to examine Table V results is to plot the monthly median GSE residuals from the models. How much of the volatility in median GSE residuals can be reduced by including the macroeconomic variables? In Figure 2 we plot the median monthly GSE residuals that result from Models (1), (2), and (4). We observe a dramatic reduction in volatility as we progress through the three models. The median residuals form Model (1), which excludes macroeconomic variables (except for the two economic condition variables, common across all models in Table V) , display considerable volatility through time. The residuals from Model (2) (dotted line), which is estimated to include the median non-GSE residuals, display somewhat lower volatility and over most periods their magnitude is less than 11 Given the strong time-series nature of monthly median non-GSE residuals, it is interesting in its own right to observe whether non-GSE residuals have explanatory power over and above that better captured through monthly time indicators.
that of the residuals from Model (1) (light solid line). The standard deviation of the monthly median GSE residuals drops from 0.54 in Model (1) to 0.50 in Model (2). The most dramatic decrease in volatility is observed in the median residuals from Model (4) (heavy solid line), and the standard deviation drops to 0.18.
B. The Response of Non-GSE and GSE Spreads to the LTCM Crisis
In Table VI However, for completeness we investigate whether the reaction is indeed fairly similar after controlling for potential changes in other factors by using a regression approach. In 12 Nine-eleven is another potential candidate to examine, but we do not do so for two reasons. First, the Federal Government engaged in a very public and active effort to inject liquidity in the economy in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, complicating the interpretation of any results. Second, the number of non-GSE issues dropped 74% from the three months prior to September 2001 to the three months that followed (the number GSE issues dropped 35%). This dramatic drop in non-GSE issues would add further to interpretation concerns due to a somewhat small sample size for non-GSE issues following the event. By contrast, even though there were also declines in issuing activity after the LTCM crisis began, the declines were less dramatic (6% for non-GSEs and 24% for GSEs) and sample sizes remain robust.
determining the starting and ending points of the crisis we follow Ericsson and Renaul (2006) , who define the crisis period as August 17, 1998 to November 20, 1998.
Model (1) in Table VI gauges the impact of the LTCM crisis on the non-GSE yield spreads by including an indicator variable for the crisis as an explanatory variable. The coefficient is positive (0.546) and highly significant, as we would expect given the spike in residual spreads we observe in the graphs during the fall of 1998. The coefficient implies that after controlling for other factors, non-GSE spreads increased around 73% on average (or 38 basis points) above the sample median non-GSE yield spread of 52 basis points. Model (2) repeats the experiment on the GSE sample, and again the indicator variable is positive and highly significant. For this sample, the coefficient implies that spreads increased around 75% on average (or 24 basis points) on average above the sample median GSE yield spread of 32 basis points. On a percent basis these reactions are remarkably similar and are clearly economically significant. It is hard to argue that the financial markets treated agency issues as close substitutes for Treasury issues during this crisis. Whether due to perceptions about default or liquidity, yields on agency debt were adversely affected in a similar way to those for corporate, financial sector debt.
In results not reported in the table, we repeat these two regressions and add the treasury yield on the right hand side (i.e., the treasury yield component of the spread). This controls for any shift that took place in the treasury yield curve itself, and helps ascertain whether the increase in spread can be completely explained by lower treasury yields as investor preferences (it has been reported) shifted toward Treasury debt. For the non-GSE sample, the coefficient on the LTCM indicator drops from 0.546 in the reported Model (1) to 0.485 in the new model. This implies that after controlling for the treasury yield, spreads increased on average by 62% (or 32 basis points) above the sample median yield spread. For the GSE sample, controlling for the treasury yield results in an LTCM coefficient of 0.337 instead of 0.557 in the reported model, implying spreads increased on average by 40% (or 13 basis points) above the sample median yield spread. Hence, for both samples the results are not purely driven by changes in Treasury yields.
The LTCM crisis may have affected preferences (and hence yields) for long-term and short-term bond differently due to potentially differential effects on perceived default risk and liquidity. In Models (3) and (4) we investigate whether this is the case and whether, once again, GSE issues were affected fairly similarly to non-GSE issues. In Model (3), which uses the non-GSE sample, we include an additional indicator variable set to one if the issue is floated during the LTCM crisis and it has a maturity of at least ten years. The negative and significant coefficient, -0.330, implies that short-term bonds were more adversely affected than long-term bonds. As we see in Model (4), we also find a similar differential effect for shortand long-term GSE issues. Once again, there are striking similarities between how the financial markets treated GSE and non-GSE issues.
VI. Concluding remarks
On many levels, investors and policy makers view agency debt as a quasi substitute for This table reports OLS regressions explaining the log spreads between when-issued yield to maturities and maturity-matched constant maturity treasury yields for non-convertible debt issued by 70 frequent issuer (non-GSE) financial firms during 1994-2004. Constant maturity treasury yields are estimated using the term structure model in Nelson and Siegel (1987) . Model (1) uses the sample of issues by non-GSE financial firms, and models (2) - (4) This table reports OLS regressions explaining the log spreads between when-issued yield to maturities and maturity-matched constant maturity treasury yields for non-convertible debt issued by five GSEs during 1994 GSEs during -2004 . Constant maturity treasury yields are estimated using the term structure model in Nelson and Siegel (1987) . In model (2), the Median Monthly Non-GSE Spread Residual is the monthly median of the residuals from model (2) of Table IV . In model (4), the Median Monthly Non-GSE Spread Residual is the monthly median of the residuals from a Non-GSE model similar to model (2) of Table IV, except that monthly indicator variables are also included in the non-GSE model. Subordination Feature and Zero-Coupon are indicator variables set to one if the issue is subordinated or zero-coupon. Log (Total Principal of Issue to Date) is the log of the principal issued under the same cusip as of the time of the issue (which differs from the current issue's principal only when an issue is reopened to float additional principal with the same terms and cusip). Log (Principal Issued During Month) and Number of Issues During Month are the log of total principal and number of issues by the issuer during the issue month (across all issues including convertible debt and floating debt 
Table VI Regressions Estimating the Effect of the Long Term Capital Management Crisis
This table reports OLS regressions explaining the log spreads between when-issued yield to maturities and maturity-matched constant maturity treasury yields for non-convertible debt issued by five GSEs and 63 frequent issuer (non-GSE) financial firms during 1994-2004. Constant maturity treasury yields are estimated using the term structure model in Nelson and Siegel (1987) . Models (1) -(2) use the sample of issues by non-GSE financial firms, and models (3) -(4) use the sample of issues by the five GSEs. LTCM crisis is an indicator variable set to one if the issue is floated between 8/14/1998 and 11/21/1998. LTCM crisis x Long-Term Bond multiplies LTCM crisis with an indicator set to one if the bond's maturity is at least 10 years. Subordination Feature and Zero-Coupon are indicator variables set to one if the issue is subordinated or zero-coupon. Log (Total Principal of Issue to Date) is the log of the principal issued under the same cusip as of the time of the issue (which differs from the current issue's principal only when an issue is reopened to float additional principal with the same terms and cusip). Log (Principal Issued During Month) and Number of Issues During Month are the log of total principal and number of issues by the issuer during the issue month (across all issues including convertible debt and floating debt). Percent of Monthly Principal Callable and Percent of Monthly Principal Floating are the percent of total issues made by the issuer during the month that are callable or floating, respectively. The Issuer Credit Rating variables are indicator variables (issues without debt ratings are the omitted class). These variables are excluded in models (3) -(4) because GSE issues do not carry formal debt ratings. In models (3) . The regressions include various explanatory variables to capture issue characteristics (subordination feature, zero-coupon, maturity, the square of maturity, and the principal of the issue), issuer behavior (dollar principal issued and the number of total issues during month, and the percents of issues during the month that are callable and floating rate), issuer credit rating indicator variables (for the non-GSE sample), indicator variables for each issuer, and economic conditions (the spread between the 3-month and 10-year treasury yields and the spread between BAA and AAA bonds).
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Non-GSE (Table IV, model 2) GSE (Table IV, . The regressions include various explanatory variables to capture issue characteristics (subordination feature, zero-coupon, maturity, the square of maturity, and the principal of the issue), issuer behavior (dollar principal issued and the number of total issues during month, and the percents of issues during the month that are callable and floating rate), issuer credit rating indicator variables (for the non-GSE sample), indicator variables for each issuer, and economic conditions (the spread between the 3-month and 10-year treasury yields and the spread between BAA and AAA bonds). The light solid line plots median residuals from a baseline model. The dashed line plots median residuals from a model that includes monthly median residuals from a Non-GSE model that are meant to capture time-varying risk premia. The dark solid line plots median residuals from a model that includes both monthly median residuals from a Non-GSE model and monthly indicator variables. 
